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THE ROLES OF COMPARATIVE LAW: INAUGURAL
LECTURE FOR THE DAN FENNO HENDERSON
PROFESSORSHIP IN EAST ASIAN LEGAL STUDIES
Daniel H. Foote*
Being named to the Dan Fenno Henderson Professorship in East Asian
Legal Studies is at one and the same time a proud and truly humbling
moment. It is especially humbling to hold a professorship bearing the
illustrious name of Dan Fenno Henderson. In the Japanese law field,
Henderson is without peer. He created the field as we know it today, and
his accomplishments are truly staggering.
When I was pondering what to say today, I first thought that I might
give a better sense of the magnitude of Henderson's accomplishments by
taking a brief retrospective tour through his works and then building
upon some of the many themes he developed. I examined the section of
the law school library that contains works by faculty authors. The
collection of his works on file, while incomplete, still occupies several
feet of shelf space. So I reconsidered, realizing that there is no such thing
as a "brief retrospective" when it comes to Dan Henderson's
accomplishments. Instead, in keeping with the designation of this
professorship as one dedicated to East Asian Legal Studies, I decided to
focus on the role-or, more precisely, the roles-played by comparative
law.
In 1995, near the end of a year I spent as a visiting professor at
Harvard Law School, a member of that faculty offered the following
terse characterization of comparative law: "You comparativists just do
whatever the hell you feel like, isn't that right?"
A different formulation--one that contains a similar sentiment, but
that I greatly prefer-was offered nearly a half century ago by Ferdinand
Stone, then-director of Tulane Law School's comparative law program.
It goes as follows:
There is a story of the man who went from place to place upon the
earth and wherever he went he would pick up bricks and compare
them carefully one with another. His conduct excited comment.
One man said, "he must be seeking the most perfect of all bricks."
*Dan Fenno Henderson Professor of East Asian Legal Studies, University of Washington School
of Law. This inaugural lecture was presented on September 25, 1996, in Seattle, Washington.
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Another said, "he must be seeking to describe the qualities inherent
in all bricks." Still another of a practical turn of mind said, "he is
probably seeking a brick of just the right shape and color to fit into
his wall." And still another said, "it is possible that he is not
interested in the bricks as such but in their composition. Perhaps, he
would set up a kiln of his own for making bricks." Finally, a man
of action, impatient with the conjecturing, said, "let us ask him and
have done with the questions." And so they approached the stranger
and asked, "for what reason do you compare the bricks?" The man
answered, "I have no reason other than that it pleases me to
compare them."1
Both characterizations reflect the sheer diversity of what routinely is
grouped under the rubric "comparative law." Comparative law
scholarship and the comparative law field cannot easily be summed up in
a few short phrases. Rather, while the primary comparisons, at least
within the Western law tradition, may have been with Roman law in the
more distant past, and between the Continental and Anglo-American
traditions in the more recent past, nowadays-as Henderson's work so
aptly reflects-comparative law quite literally spans the globe. It also
spans the ages. It extends to virtually all fields of law, from Aadministrative law, for example-to Z (it took me a while, but how about
zoning?). In orientation, it may be historical or sociological,
anthropological or economic. It may be descriptive or prescriptive.
Indeed, it may not be explicitly "comparative" at all. Much comparative
law scholarship, including some of the best, on its face focuses entirely
on a foreign law topic without directly comparing it to anything found in
the author's home country. The comparative element is largely implicit,
found both in the focus adopted by the author and in what the reader
gleans.
Thus, on first glance comparative law may appear to be a large,
disparate, and altogether amorphous mass. Yet I vastly prefer the latter of
the two characterizations quoted earlier, not just for the elegance of the
language, but for the interpretation it offers. The first characterization of
comparative law as subject to the whims of the comparativist adopts a
bleak interpretation. It suggests a field bereft of any clear dimensions,
rather like a ship adrift at sea, moving about aimlessly, without fixed
bearings and with no guiding principles upon which it might be moored.
The latter quote offers a contrasting interpretation of the field-not as
I. Ferdinand F. Stone, The End To Be Served by ComparativeLaw, 25 Tul. L. Rev. 325, 325
(1951).

Roles of Comparative Law
one serving no functions, but rather as one serving such a diverse array
of functions that it is impossible to sum up concisely. Comparative law
serves all of the roles alluded to in that quote-seeking the most perfect
system, seeking to identify aspects inherent in all systems, seeking to
identify an alternative that best fits one's own system, seeking to learn
more about the legal process itself. It serves all of those and many more.
As I turn to consider a few of these roles more closely, let me begin
with the last one on Stone's list-because it pleases me.2 This may be the
most important aspect of all: the sheer joy of discovery, the fascination
of learning of other cultures and legal systems. I dare say that when Dan
Henderson read his first village contract from Tokugawa Japan, his
initial reaction was not to categorize it or analyze its significance. Rather,
his very first reaction was undoubtedly delight at learning more about
village life of that period. It is that very joy of discovery that impels
much of the best comparative work.
Yet I submit that the rationale offered by Stone's brick-o-phile is in
another sense utterly unbelievable. For the process simply does not stop
at the level of mere disinterested observation, the way it might for a
traveler watching passing scenery out a train window. Rather, the human
mind inevitably seeks to process and assimilate information. As the
number of observations expands, the mind looks for patterns and seeks to
draw parallels or contrasts.
On occasion, that may be as far as it goes, but frequently the mind
goes further in the search for ordering principles. The form of that search
may vary dramatically. When differences are noted, the searcher may
seek to account for those differences by asking, for example, where a
particular approach came from. The search may become a weighing of
the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches. It may turn into an
exploration of how a particular legal system relates to a particular society
and thus lead to a richer understanding of that society. It might take that
approach one step further and ponder how, or whether, that system might
fit in some other society. It may become a search for universal values. Or
it may turn into a reverie upon the role of law itself. Yet whatever form
the inquiry takes, it is almost certain not to stop at the "Gee, isn't that
nice!" attitude of Stone's protagonist.
And whatever the nature of that additional inquiry, the very act of
undertaking the examination provides a reminder that ours is not the only
legal system in the world and that legal systems are not preordained and

2. See supratext accompanying note 1.
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immutable. Indeed, the single most important aspect of comparative law
may not be what one learns about some other legal system, but rather
what one learns about one's own legal system. Just as one returns from
travel abroad with a newfound appreciation for many aspects of U.S.
society, so too the study of a foreign legal system leads to a new
awareness of many aspects of our own system that we all too often tend
to take for granted.
I might offer an example from one of my own major areas of interest,
criminal justice. In Duncan v. Louisiana, Justice White confidently
asserted that "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice."3 The jury is not, however, a universallyrecognized institution, and I assume that most people in the United States
today are well aware of the fact that the jury system does not exist in
much of the world. Yet far fewer Americans have any inkling of how
many other aspects of U.S. law-including evidentiary standards, the
trial and appeals processes, retrial standards, and even attitudes toward
the criminal justice system itself-are intimately tied to notions of the
jury as ultimate finder of fact. These aspects readily become apparent
when one reexamines the United States after studying a foreign non-jury
criminal justice system.
Of course, in today's global economy, comparative law also plays a
much more straightforward, practical role. According to the latest
estimates, one in four jobs in Washington State is dependent on
international trade.4 With that level of global interdependence,
transnational issues frequently arise for practicing attorneys, often from
unanticipated directions.
One of my favorite examples of unexpected international contacts
relates to one of the last projects I worked on while practicing as an
attorney inNew York. That case involved the acquisition of a ranch in
Dillon, Montana. Our local counsel on the matter, Bob Knight of
Missoula, Montana, had spent most of his career handling ranch deals.
He explained that in the 1970s, these were almost exclusively local
affairs, with Montanans on both sides of the deal. By the early 1980s,
New York and then Hollywood money had appeared on the scene, but he
still had no contact with foreign investment. Then, in 1988, my firm
retained Knight to handle Montana law aspects of an acquisition by a
major Japanese beef packing company. (Parenthetically, but as a telling
reminder that much domestic U.S. law also involves significant
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
4. Richard S. Conway, Jr., ForeignExports and the Washington State Economy 11 (1997).
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comparative elements, I am not sure whether Knight had more trouble
explaining water law to the Japanese or to us East Coast attorneys.) He
did such a good job on the case that the client introduced him to other
investors, and I understand that he is now a trusted advisor to a number
of foreign companies. So, like Bob Knight, even if you spend the first
twenty years of your career handling nothing but local cases and think
you will never have any connection to transnational matters, you may
walk into work some day and discover that you, too, are now an
international lawyer.
The potential for unanticipated international work poses a potential
dilemma for legal education. How should one go about preparing
students for possible, but by no means certain, transnational work?
In my view, every student's exposure to comparative law should go
beyond what Dan Henderson has aptly labeled to class after class of
LL.M. students at the University of Washington as "parallel exposition":
merely setting out descriptions of two approaches side by side, with no
further analysis. To give a better sense of what that means, let me tell
you about a classic example of "parallel exposition" with which I
recently came face to face. I was asked to review a book. The book
contained a two-page preface and a five-page afterword; the remaining
750 pages consisted exclusively of the provisions in Japan's Civil
Procedure Code, along with the closest corresponding provisions from
the laws of the United States, Germany, Italy, France, Austria, and South
Korea (all translated into Japanese).5 I understand that the materials were
originally prepared by an advisory council that was drafting a thorough
revision of Japan's Civil Procedure Code, and in that context it was
undoubtedly valuable to consider how other nations have approached
similar issues.6 From the standpoint of legal practice, though, I fear that
in certain hands a work such as this, containing nothing but the bare
language of the statutes, may do more harm than good. If a practitioner,
book in hand, reads a particular provision-let us say on service of
process-and believes that tells the whole story, he or she may be doing
a grave disservice to a client (and perhaps engaging in malpractice in the
process).
My own experience with a somewhat similar project highlights this
concern. Several years ago I edited a set of English translations of
5. Kakkolai minji sosh6hd sansho jobun [Comparative Provisions of Each Nation's Civil
Procedure Code] (Minji soshoho gendaigoka kenkyukai [Study Group for Placing the Civil
Procedure Code into Modem Language] ed., Shinzansha 1995).
6. Mikazuki Akira, Preface to Kakkoku minji soshahOsanshOjObun, supranote 5, at v-vi.
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Japan's major labor laws.7 I dutifully cleaned up the translation of Article
20 of the Labor Standards Law, which reads in part: "In the event that
an employer wishes to dismiss a worker, the employer shall provide at
least 30 days advance notice. An employer who does not give 30 days
advance notice shall pay the average wages for a period of not less than
30 days." 8 On its face, the statute appears to permit employers to
discharge workers without cause, so long as the specified notice or wages
in lieu of notice are provided. From my own study, I knew that the courts
had largely written that language out of the statute through a series of
decisions that effectively required employers to show just cause for
discharging employees, regardless of whether the employer had provided
notice or paid the additional wages referred to in the statute.9 But the
project was only a translation of the statutes themselves, without
annotations, so such a warning never appeared in the book.
A few years later, a judge in Tokyo District Court showed me a
discharge letter that a foreign company had issued. That letter directly
quoted the statute and went on to say that, to show the company's good
faith, it would pay the worker sixty days' wages---"which represents," I
quote from memory, "twice what you are entitled to under the Labor
Standards Law." According to the judge, this letter had displayed such
utter obliviousness to the standards actually applied by the courts that it
had simply served to infuriate the worker, thus making it even more
difficult to reach a settlement.
As that incident shows, a little learning may indeed be a dangerous
thing. It is not enough just to examine the language of the statute.
Obviously, one also needs to know how the statute has been interpreted.
But is that enough? What about enforcement mechanisms? Can one get
access to the courts? Are attorneys available? How much do they cost?
And are there alternatives to litigation? What, for example, is the role of
unions? Or of the Ministry of Labor? Taking it a step further, what
impact do attitudes toward one's company, or litigation, or reputation
have on the outcome? Does it matter whether one is dealing with a
foreign company? What have the historical trends been and what does
the future hold?

7. Ministry of Labour (Japan), LabourLaws ofJapan(Institute of Labour Admin. 1990).
8. Id. at 65.
9. See Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the
Service of-Stability?, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 635, 639-65 (1996) (discussing case law and judiciallycreated standards governing dismissal).
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Suddenly one finds that, to truly understand the ramifications of even
a single issue such as dismissal, one needs to know a tremendous amount
about how law operates in that society. Yet how on earth can we expect
any U.S. practitioner to familiarize him or herself with all of these
aspects, even of a single field such as labor law? Not to mention
multiplying it by other fields of law, or by other nations? Obviously, we
cannot expect anyone to study all of this.
Still, this example shows why, at least for students with a truly
focused interest in a specific nation, it is valuable to undertake a
comprehensive study of some particular field of law, rather than just the
broad overview that survey courses often provide. The field chosen is not
so important. Rather, what is important is the sharpened focus provided
by a careful inquiry into a given field and the inherent complexities such
an inquiry will reveal.
But what of the student who has no particular interest in foreign law
or transnational issues? Given the increasing importance of international
issues and the unanticipated manner in which such issues may arise, I
believe that all students should be exposed to comparative law in a
meaningful way. This does not mean that all students must become
experts in foreign law. Rather, what is vital is developing an awareness
of certain broad differences between the major legal systems; a
sensitivity to differences, to complexities of the sort I just referred to, and
to the misunderstandings that often result; and, most important of all, a
recognition of one's own limitations-of when one should seek out
additional expertise.
Let me now turn to two other roles of comparative law: learning from
other legal systems and, its corollary, offering lessons to other systems.
The former of these traditionally has received far more attention than the
latter, but I would like to reverse the order.
It may seem presumptuous to speak of teaching other systems. Indeed,
at a conference on Japanese law held in Berlin in late 1995,10 which both
Dan Henderson and I attended, two German scholars strongly questioned
what right foreigners have to lecture Japan on what its legal system
should provide.' Dr. Guntram Rahn noted that Japan has a sophisticated
10. Japan: Economic Success and Legal System, Berlin, Germany (Nov. 22-24, 1995)
[hereinafter Berlin Conference]. Papers presented at the conference, along with a summary of the
conference proceedings, appear in Japan:Economic Success and Legal System (Harold Baum ed.,

1997).
11. See D6rte Liebrecht, Informality, Flexibility, and the Rule ofLaw: A Report of the Discussion,
in Japan:Economic Success and Legal System, supra note 10, at 373, 377 (remarks of Matthias K.
Scheer), 389 (remarks of Guntram Rahn).
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legal system of its own; he argued that the criteria for evaluating that
legal system and societal norms should only be the principles of that
system itself. 2
My first response is that, at least for those of us who regularly teach
foreign students, offering lessons to other nations is something that I
hope goes on all the time, albeit often indirectly and rather vicariously.
Providing lessons to other nations occurs through the impact that we
have on our students and later through their contributions once they have
returned to their home countries.
My second, more pragmatic, answer is that, at least in the case of
Japan, we frequently are asked to give advice. There is a grand tradition
in Japan of calling upon foreign "legal experts" to offer their opinions on
a wide range of issues. One of the most well-known examples of this
phenomenon occurred over a century ago, when leading scholars from
the major Western nations (including James Bradley Thayer and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.) were asked their views on the Meiji Constitution of
1889.' But the pattern has deeper historical roots, and it continues to this
day. Sometimes this is borne out of a genuine desire to learn; other times
it is part of a conscious law reform campaign, in an effort to give the
imprimatur of foreign approval to a particular cause. 4 This does not
mean that the advice is always followed-far from it; still, one of the
gratifying aspects of Japanese law is the sense that one's views often are
given serious consideration.
Of course, as Dr. Rahn would undoubtedly point out, there is a big
difference between responding to requests and proffering unsolicited
advice. As he himself observed, though, there is one category of issue
where most agree it is proper for the comparativist to offer his or her
views: the category of fundamental, universal values. I" Defining which
values qualify may lead to considerable disagreement-whether to
include participatory democracy, for example. Yet, the protestations of

12. Id. at 389.
13. See, e.g., Kenzo Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development ofJapanese Law,
1868-1961, in Law in Japan: The Legal Order in a ChangingSociety 5, 7-9 (Arthur Taylor von
Mehren ed., 1963).
14. This point was brought home to me vividly a few years ago. An LL.M. candidate who was
active in the kardshi (death from overwork) movement in Japan stopped by my office at the start of
the year, shortly after he arrived in the United States. Instead of the typical inquiries about course
selection and program requirements, all of his questions that day concerned how to achieve
maximum publicity about kardshi in the United States-how, for example, to get articles about
kar(shi in newspapers such as the New York Times.
15. Guntram Rahn, Remarks at Berlin Conference, supranote 10.
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China and other nations notwithstanding, it is entirely fitting for
comparativists to challenge abuses of basic human rights and to seek the
achievement of fundamental values.
In the Japanese context, one aspect that I have found troubling ever
since my first visit in 1974 is equality, both of gender and race. At a
symposium on immigration issues held in Osaka in 1993,16 1 argued that
certain aspects of Japan's immigration policies were racially biased (and
misguided in other respects, as well). 7 These observations elicited an
immediate and rather vociferous response. To much applause, one
questioner asked what right I, a citizen of the United States, with all of its
racial problems, had to comment on the racial preferences contained in
Japanese law. My answer is simple. Despite the United States' legacy of
racism (a legacy that, I probably need not point out, includes many
aspects of immigration law), the United States truly does have experience
that may be instructive for other nations; and comparativists not only can
comment on such matters, but should speak out and not stand idly by.
In the context of trade and regulatory matters, which was the setting in
which this topic arose at the Berlin conference, the values involved
typically are not so fundamental in nature, and the situation is more
complex. To the extent that the standards in question are being applied to
foreign parties or substantially affect foreign interests, foreign observers
clearly have a legitimate interest in commenting on those standards.
Moreover, standards favored by the ruling elite in a given nation may
harm other segments of that society. Nevertheless, comparativists from
other nations may be in a better position to challenge the standards
because of the improved power of observation a broader perspective
often provides, or because the insiders may face formal or informal
constraints on their ability to speak out, or because the foreign views
may carry more clout. In the Japanese case, a reminder that foreign
observers may be better able than domestic parties to challenge the
existing order is provided by the fact that the United States' push for
greater deregulation of Japan's economy was widely welcomed by many
Japanese consumer groups (which lacked much clout) and many business

16. Foreign Workers Problems: Japan and the U.S., Osaka, Japan (Mar. 23, 1993). Papers
presented at the symposium appear in Foreign Workers Problems: Japan and the U.S. (Shigenori
Matsui & Susumu Noda eds., 1993).
17. Daniel H. Foote, Immigration Law and Foreign Workers: A U.S. Perspective, in Foreign
Workers Problems, supranote 16, at 28, 53-56.
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leaders as well (whose ability to speak out was hampered by concerns
over their relationships with regulators). 8
At the same time, this does not mean that one should feel free to offer
unfettered comments and advice without reflecting on differences
between legal systems and societies. In some of the U.S. government's
recent demands for change, I have sensed a troubling assumption that the
legal standards followed in the United States--or even worse, some
idealized version of the U.S. standards found only in books-represent
the only true and proper approach. This attitude is often coupled with a
seeming lack of recognition that other legal systems might be pursuing
other legitimate aims, or that the United States itself might be the outlier,
rather than the norm.
Moreover, in commenting on foreign legal systems, one must bear in
mind that even when two systems purport to espouse the same values,
those values may be conceptualized quite differently, and countervailing
values may be involved as well. Both the United States and Japan, for
example, espouse the value of competition. However, while competition
often seems to be regarded as the be-all and end-all in the United
States-the ultimate trump card, as it were-in Japan it frequently is
treated as but one among many interrelated societal values.
In another example, one from the criminal justice field, when I first
investigated the Japanese interrogation system, I was appalled at what I
found. The Constitution and Criminal Procedure Code, which were both
heavily influenced by the Occupation, contain a number of provisions
recognizing the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to
silence. 9 They do so in seemingly unambiguous terms. Yet the courts
have consistently accepted the prosecutors' position that, following
arrest, suspects are subject to questioning, without any attorney present,
for up to twenty-three days before charges must be filed."0 Under this
interpretation, which is based upon a narrow reading of another statutory
provision," suspects do not have to answer any questions, but they have
'
a "duty to submit to questioning."22
18. Presumably because of the concerns over their relations with regulators, until recently the
business leaders typically voiced their support behind closed doors.
19. See Daniel H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in Japan, 21 Ga. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 415, 426 n.65 (1991) (citing provisions).
20. Id, at429-35.
21. Keiji sosh0ho [Code of Criminal Procedure], Law No. 131 of 1948, art. 198(1) (Japan)
("[E]xcept in cases where the suspect is under arrest or in detention, the suspect may refuse to appear
[for questioning] or, having appeared, may leave at any time.").
22. See Foote, supranote 19, at 435-36.
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This is very far indeed from what I would regard as a true right to
silence. But a comprehensive examination of the entire Japanese criminal
justice system persuades me that other factors must also be taken into
consideration. One such factor is a greater trust in the authorities. Even
more importantly, I see a different prevailing ethos for the Japanese
criminal justice system than for that in the United States. The Japanese
ethos (which I have dubbed "benevolent paternalism ' ) places a much
greater emphasis upon individualized justice and so-called specific
prevention. In it, criminal justice authorities place great effort into
"converting" offenders-getting them to recognize the error of their
ways and to turn over a new leaf. Then, if persuaded that the offenders
are unlikely to reoffend, the authorities often seek to return the offenders
to the community rather than send them to prison.
To achieve success in a criminal justice system such as Japan's, claim
prosecutors, it is essential that they conduct intensive questioning aimed
not only at proving the elements of the crime but also at ultimately
seeking the moral catharsis of the offender. At times, as critics of my
articles have been quick to point out, this is undoubtedly simply a selfserving justification for the nearly total discretion that prosecutors
desire;24 and, as I myself have written, it may be possible to introduce
greater safeguards against abuse without undermining the beneficial
aspects of the system.' Nonetheless, when viewed from the perspective
of the overall criminal justice system, Japan's approach to questioning
makes far more sense than it might at first appear to someone expecting
the Miranda-style26 regime that the language of Japan's Constitution and
Criminal Procedure Code imply.
Reflecting on the Japanese system also forces one to ponder whether
the U.S. criminal justice system, when taken as a whole, with its
seemingly ever-escalating resort to harsher and harsher penalties and
more and more prisons, represents a preferable approach. Indeed, one is
even left with the question whether the United States' vaunted due
process protections, as they apply in practice to the vast majority of
suspects, provide that much more in the way of safeguards than do
Japan's standards.
23. See Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 Cal.
L. Rev. 317 (1992).
24. See, e.g., Antonie A. G. Peters, Some ComparativeObservationson the CriminalProcess in
Holland and Japan, in Proceedings of the Symposium: Dutch and JapaneseLaws Compared259,
267-68 n.6 (International Ctr.for Comp. L. & Pol. 1993).
25. See, e.g., Foote, supranote 23, at 382-84; Foote, supra note 19, at 477-82.
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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This leads to the corollary role for comparative law: learning from the
experiences of other nations. Just as it is dangerous for us to assume that
U.S. standards will apply in other societies in the same way that they do
inours, so too it is risky, without first carefully considering other aspects
of U.S. society that may affect the equation, to counsel the United States
to adopt an approach that works well elsewhere. In the criminal justice
context, for example, I fear that broad-scale borrowing from Japan would
be dangerous; I worry that we would end up with the worst aspects of the
Japanese system, without the benefits.
Still, there is a tendency in the United States to reject comparative
lessons out of hand, based on the perception that U.S. society is unique
and, in the process, underestimate the similarities between nations. One
example relates to the role of community. As with just about everyone
else who has looked at Japan very closely, I agree that a key feature of
Japanese society and the Japanese legal system is a strong
communitarian orientation. In addition to that orientation's great
strengths, a close examination of the Japanese experience also reveals
some serious shortcomings,27 so I would not advocate uncritically
adopting all the communitarian features one finds. Yet there is little fear
of reaching that point, for I have seen a marked tendency among many
Americans to reject any thought of emulating Japan, on the basis of an
often-unarticulated perception that Japan's "community-oriented"
society and the United States' "individual-oriented" society are diametric
opposites.
That perception of course is not true. Consider police practices. There
is a widespread belief that, in Japan, community cooperation with police
occurs naturally and almost effortlessly. This simply is not so.
Particularly with Japan's rampant urbanization and increasing mobility,
the police put tremendous effort into fostering and maintaining
community involvement through, for example, a broad network of
neighborhood watch groups and traffic safety groups. And it seems as
though every three or four years the official White Paper on Police calls
for yet another wave of rededication by the police, at all levels, to the
goal of maintaining community involvement. As these steps reflect, even
in Japan it takes great effort to make community policing work. At the
same time, the success that many U.S. cities-Seattle included-have
had with community policing suggests that the two societies are not so
dissimilar as is often assumed. This common experience should counsel a
27. See, e.g., Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through the
Window ofJapan, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 517.
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greater willingness to consider whether other communitarian aspects of
Japan's legal system might not fit well in the United States as well.
Perhaps the single greatest lesson from Japan for the United States lies
in attitudes toward comparative law itself. Throughout much of its
history, Japan has shown a tremendous receptivity to foreign law.
Although now largely forgotten, there was such a period in the United
States as well-during much of the country's formative period through
the Civil War. Yet, with isolated exceptions, in recent times the United
States has paid relatively little attention to foreign models. Even when
they are discussed, foreign examples often are treated only as evidence to
support positions that have already been determined, rather than as part
of a systematic effort to consider available alternatives.
Japan provides a striking contrast. In the civil procedure situation I
mentioned earlier, the advisory council did indeed recommend a major
revision to the Civil Procedure Code, informed in significant part by the
council's extensive investigation of the systems of a half-dozen foreign
nations.28 That set of revisions was enacted by the Diet in mid-1996.29 In
Japan, considering comparative models is the norm rather than the
exception.
The same attitude extends to legal education. I first became aware of
the extent of the comparative focus in 1983, when I was selecting
seminars to attend at the University of Tokyo. Because I was there to
study Japanese law, I naturally wanted to choose seminars focused on
Japanese law rather than foreign law. The task turned out to be far more
difficult than I had expected. There were many seminar offerings. For at
least two-thirds of them, however, the written description made clear that
the primary focus was either foreign or comparative law. Even when the
description did not mention such a focus, I could not assume that the
focus would be Japan. For example, alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
was still a relatively new field in the United States, and there was much
discussion here in the United States about the possibility of learning from
Japan. Thus, I was excited to discover a seminar devoted to the
resolution of minor disputes, with no hint in either the title or written
description that the focus was on anything but Japan. When I called the
professor to ask if I might attend, he said I was more than welcome, but
that I should realize that the sole focus of the seminar would be on recent
U.S. innovations in ADR, rather than on any Japanese approaches.

28. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
29. Minji soshoho [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 109 of 1996 (Japan).
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The emphasis on foreign and comparative law in Japanese legal
education has, if anything, intensified since then. A friend on the law
faculty at a major Japanese university recently told me that the position
of the so-called Anglo-American law professors, who specialize in
comparative law rather than in any single substantive field, has become
somewhat ambiguous in recent years. This is not because they find
themselves with too much to cover, but with too little. Today, most
Japanese faculty members who specialize in substantive courses have
studied abroad themselves. They regularly engage in comparative
research and incorporate comparative elements into their teaching. In the
process, these substantive law specialists have steadily encroached on the
niche that comparative law professors previously occupied.
As I once observed in a leading Japanese law journal, the two-to-one
ratio of foreign and comparative law seminars to domestic law seminars,
which I found when I studied at the University of Tokyo, places too
much emphasis on foreign and comparative law.3" Nevertheless, the
blurring of the distinction between comparative law and substantive law
comes close to my ideal for the position that comparative law should
occupy in legal education. In my view, the most desirable approach is not
to treat comparative law as an isolated specialty, but rather to incorporate
significant comparative law aspects into each of the first year and most
upper level substantive courses. This would, in one fell swoop, achieve
nearly all of the objectives I have referred to above. Moreover, in a law
school such as ours at the University of Washington, with a very strong
group of foreign graduate students each year, it would more fully
integrate those students, and the broad perspectives they bring, into the
learning and teaching process.
While some other law schools may do more in the way of trumpeting
their global connections-or at least their global aspirations-I take
great pride in the fact that the University of Washington School of Law
comes closer to this ideal than any other U.S. law school of which I am
aware. By 1976, when I began to consider applying to law school, I was
well aware of the achievements of Dan Henderson and John Haley; they,
and this law school, already had established a reputation as leaders in
Japanese law. Until I joined the faculty in 1988, however, I had no
inkling of the breadth and depth of the rest of the faculty's comparative
work. As a comparativist, I truly feel a part of the fiber of this institution
in a way that is rare at other law schools in the United States.
30. Daniel H. Foote, Nihon no h~gaku kyciku insha"ki [ImpressionsofJapaneseLegal Education],
863 Jurisuto 53, 60 (1986).

Roles of Comparative Law
At a meeting of the American Society of Comparative Law a few
years ago, a leading comparative law scholar bemoaned the isolation of
comparative law and the deep divide between comparativists and
substantive law scholars at U.S. law schools.3 Virtually every head in
the room bobbed up and down in vigorous agreement. I, seemingly
alone, could only look around a bit sheepishly and beam in inward
delight at this visual reminder of how exceptional the University of
Washington is. This, I have no doubt, is in large part just one more
aspect of Dan Henderson's great legacy. Even so, this law school is far
from fully achieving the ideal I just set forth, in which comparative law
perspectives will become an integral feature of most substantive law
courses; I do not foresee us fully achieving it anytime soon.
Nor do I anticipate a convergence in views on the precise contours of
this thing we call "comparative law." Quite the contrary, I anticipate
even greater expansion in the scope of comparative law. Just as Dan
Henderson opened people's eyes to the richness and importance of
Japanese law, so too are others now undertaking pathbreaking work in
the legal systems of what are sometimes called "radically different
cultures" (including socialist, Muslim, Hindu, and African legal
systems). This work at times reveals new and different ways of
conceptualizing legal issues. Still other scholars are applying relatively
new theoretical approaches to the comparative setting-approaches such
as feminist jurisprudence and law and economics. These efforts often
reveal previously undetected commonalities among legal systems.
Rather than bring neatness and tidiness to the comparative law field,
these trends seem certain to result in an even more disheveled,
amorphous appearance for the field. Yet far from being a reason to decry
comparative law, these exciting new directions represent even more
reason to embrace it and all that it has to offer.

31. Mary Ann Glendon, Remarks at the Joint Conference of the International Association of Legal
Science and the American Society of Comparative Law, Provo, Utah (Sept. 10-12, 1992).
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